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II! THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

CITY OF ST. GEORGE/

'. ' 1

Plaintiff/Respondent,
y

vs.

1

ELZA E. MILLER,

'i

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 890636-CA

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
I. JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal in this matter
pursuant to U.C.A. 1953 §78-2A-3 (2) (c) (Replacement Volume 9, 1987
Edition.), and Rule 3(a) of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals.
II. NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
This appeal follows a jury verdict in Washington County Fifth
Circuit Court, Criminal Case No. 891000968, finding Appellant guilty
of violating §1102(a), of the Uniform Plumbing Code as adopted by
the City of St. George, a Class B
At
directed

the

close

verdict,

of

the

Misdemeanor.

State's

dismissing

the

case,

Appellant

Information.

That

moved

for

motion

a

was

denied.
Appellant

testified

and

denied

Information.

-1-

the

allegations

in

the

Following presentation of the evidence the jury deliberated and
returned a verdict of guilty.

Appellant1s Motion for a Judgment of

acquittal notwithstanding the verdict was denied and sentence was
imposed on October 3, 198 9. This appeal follows.
III. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether the facts presented

at trial were

sufficient to

establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Appellant had violated
§1102 (a) of the Utah Uniform Plumbing Code, as adopted by the City
of St. George.
2.

Whether the Trial Court's refusal

to allow Appellant

to

present evidence that there was no animosity between Appellant and
the person during whose tenancy the sewer was clogged, in order to
demonstrate lack of motive, denied Appellant his right to present a
meaningful defense.
3.

Whether the Trial Judge should have been disqualified from

sitting as a presiding judicial officer at the jury trial in this
case where the Judge had, in prior matters, ruled against Appellant
despite

Appellant's

court's

ultimate

testimony

finding,

the

which
court

directly
was

contradicted

aware

of

the

Appellantfs

criminal record arising out of disputes with persons living in his
neighborhood and the Trial Judge, in his response to the Affidavit
of Bias or Prejudice emphasized his perception of the leniency of
the sentence in the prior matter, citing several aggravating aspects
of that case.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
CONSIDERED DETERMINATIVE
Article I, Section 12 of the Utah State Constitution.
r

:h^ Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

Utah Code Annotated §77-35-29.
Rule 401 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
Rule 402 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a jury verdict finding the Appellant
guilty of depositing material in the public sewer which would or
could cause damage to the public sewer, in violation cf §1102 (a) of
the Uniform Plumbing Code as adopted by the City of St. George.
This is a Class B Misdemeanor.

The facts relevant to the issues

presented for review are:
On June 21, 1989, an Information was filed, charging Appellant
with violating §1102(a) of the Uniform Plumbing Code as adopted by
the City of St. George (Record at 1) .

Appellant was served with a

Summons in the matter' on June 25, 1989 (Record at 2 ) . On July 12,
1989,

Appellant

filed

an

Affidviat

of

Bias

or

Prejudice

and

requested that another Judge be appointed to hear the case (Record
at 6) .

In a written Order and Response, the Trial Judge referred

the matter for review, pursuant to UCA §77-35-29(b)
The

Judge

to whom

the

matter

was

referred

(Record at 9 ) .

acknowledged

having

reviewed the Affidavit and Order/Response and determined that the
Affidavit

did

not

show

sufficient

grounds

for

disqualification

(Record at 10). The matter proceeded to a jury trial, presided over
by the Judge for whom disqualification was sought (Record at 58).
At The jury trial the following facts were presented.
In 1970, John B. Hopkins moved into a mobile home located at
1932 foest 1700 North, St. George, Utah,

(Transcript at 14) .

He

lived

there until approximately

trial.

At

that

time

he

had

one and one-half
moved

into

his

years prior

new

wife's

tc

home

(Transcript at 15).
When Mr. Hopkins moved into his mobile home in 1970 there was a
public sewer near the property

(Transcript at 17) .

Appellant, who

had acquired the lot just to the east of Mr. Hopkins (Transcript at
15, 16) and Mr. Hopkins discussed connecting each one's property tc
the

city

sewer

(Transcript

at

by

putting

17

and

each

one's

81), although

line

in

there

the

was

same

trench

contradicting

testimony as to whether or not an agreement had been reached in that
regard (See Transcript at 81 and 17).
At the time the sewer was installed Appellant was not present
(Transcript at 18) •
never

discussed

Although Mr. Hopkins paid for the trench, he

payment

for

the

trench

with

the

Appellant

(Transcript at 18) but did request that Appellant reimburse him for
pipe that was installed (Transcript at 112).
The trench for the pipe was dug and pipe layed on Appellant's
property

for

the

sewer which

serviced

Mr. Hopkins' mobile

home

(Transcript at 19). The pipe is located just east of a block wall
that separates Appellant's and Mr. Hopkins' property. (Transcript at
19) .
The. trench
Appellant's

for

property

the
was

sewer
dug

by

line
the

which
City

was
of

St.

backfilled by employees of the City of St. George
33).

Mr.

Hopkins

did

not

observe

(Transcript at 33).
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the

installed
George

on
and

(Transcript at

backfilling

process

After the sewer line was installed, Appellant put a mobile home
on his lot

(Transcript at 20) , but never did connect to the City

Sewer System (Transcript at 111).
Prior to Appellant's moving permanently onto his lot next to
Mr, Hopkins1 property but after the sewer line had been installed,
Mr, Hopkins caused a clean out to his sewer line to be added on
Appellant's property so as to accommodate Mr. Hopkins1 brother and
provide a place for Mr. Hopkins1 brother to dump sewage out of his
mobile home

(Transcript at 29-30) . The parties had no significant

disputes until approximately a year and a half to two and a half
years prior to trial when Mr. Hopkins remarried and indicated an
intent to move off of the property and sell his mobile home and lot
(Transcript at 83) .
Although Appellant denies having made any threats to block Mr.
Hopkins1 sewer should he move from the property
Mr.

Hopkins

testified

that,

shortly

after

(Transcript at 88)
his

marriage,

the

Appellant stated to him "I am not going to let you sell that place.
Just

the

minute

(Transcript

you

sell

that

place... I'll

at 22) and Mr. Hopkins1

block

the

sewer."

current wife, Vedra Hopkins

testified that shortly after their marriage she overheard Appellant
tell Mr. Hopkins that he was going to "block your sewer if you ever,
try to sell it

[the property] to anybody."

(Transcript at 135).

Although Vedra Hopkins indicated that she did not hear any other
threat by Appellant
Hopkins

indicated

to block

that

there

the

sewer

were

(Transcript

similar

Appellant approximately five or six times

at

statements

138) Mr.
made

(Transcript at 23) .

by
The

last

of

these

statements

was

alleged

to

have

been

made

on

approximately May 15, 1989 (Transcript at 35) just before the then
renter moved out of the property
was present when the alleged

(Transcript at 3G) .

statements were made

No one else

(Transcript at

22) .
After their marriagef Mr* and Mrs. Hopkins caused a "for sale"
sign to be placed on the property serviced by the sewer line that
runs through Appellant's property (Transcript at 23).
of Aprilr
Hopkins1

In the middle

1989, an individual by the name of Ed moved
property

and

stayed

there

for

approximately

into the
one

month

(Transcript at 26 and 35). Although "Ed" had an option to purchase
the property, the option was not set out in any written agreement.
Mr.

Hopkins did not tell Appellant that Ed intended

property

(Transcript

at

27)

nor

was

there

any

to buy

other

the

evidence

presented at trial that Appellant ever became aware that Ed was a
prospective purchaser of the property.
Although the testimony was somewhat confusing with reference to
when the sewer was blocked and when Ed moved off of the property,
there was testimony presented at trial that the sewer was blocked
just before Ed moved out (Transcript at 26) which would have been
mid May, 1989 (Transcript at 35).
Mr. Hopkins became aware of the sewer having been blocked when
Ed told him that the sewer had backed up in the bathroom of Mr.
Hopkins' mobile home located on the property (Transcript at 24-26).
After

receiving

complaints

with

reference

to the blockage, City

employees went to Mr. Hopkins1 property, located the sewer line on
Mr. Hopkins' property, exposed the sewer line approximately one to

-6-

two

feet

to

the

west

side

of

the

wall

which

separated

the

properties, removed a piece of pipe approximately two feet long,
allowed the sewage to drain out of the pipe, swabbed cut water and
other material from the inside of the pipe and inserted a camera
into the line from Mr. Hopkins1 property (Transcript at 39-40).

The

camera had its own light source and displayed, on a monitor, a black
and white view of the inside of the sewer line (Transcript at 40 and
54).

No tape was kept of what was viewed on the monitor (Transcript

at 42) , although the City had the equipment to keep a permanent
record

of

what

was

observed

(Transcript

at

46) .

There

was

a

cleanout for the sewer line on Mr. Hopkins' property, located near
his mobile home and
cleanout

to where

the pipe

ran

a 45° bend was

in a straight
noted

line

on Appellant's

from

that

property

(Transcript at 42-45, 55) and that straight section of pipe slopes
approximately 2% (Transcript at 56).
About 14 to 16 feet in from the opening, in the direction of
Appellant's property, just past a cleanout observed on Appellant's
property (Transcript at 63) the operator of the camera observed what
was identified by him as a rock in the sewer pipe (Transcript at 50)
almost the same diameter as the inside of the pipe
51).
by

(Transcript at

Although the cleanout was not apparent en Appellant's property

looking

at the surface of his property

(Transcript at

51) a

cleanout on Appellant's property was apparent with the video camera
(Transcript at 51-52) . The cleanout was located at or near the 45°
bend in the pipe (Transcript at 52). No effort was made by the City
personnel observing the pipe to remove the "rock"
64).

No

scratches

were

observed

on

the

inside

(Transcript at
of

the

pipe

(Transcript

at 71) .

However, they would have been difficult

to

detect if they had been there (Transcript at 55).
None

of

Appellant

the witnesses

place

anything

who
in

testified

the

sewer

at

trial

system.

observed

the

However,

the

Appellant denied placing a rock or any other item in the sewer line
in order to plug it (Transcript at 89).
Appellant testified

and a video tape was

shown to the ]ury

displaying Appellant digging out the cleanout on his side of the
property, removing the cap and examining the interior and exterior
of the cleanout.

The video taping was conducted approximately three

weeks prior to trial (Transcript at 78). In order to remove the cap
Appellant used a hammer and a wood chisel and testified at trial
that the cap was set tight (Transcript at 97) .

However, Appellant

did acknowledge that the cap could set tight within a period of
approximately six months (Transcript at 121).
Approximately

eight

feet

downgrade

from

the

cleanout

on

Appellant's property a blockage was detected when Appellant placed a
sewer cable in the line

(Transcript at 99) .

Appellant testified

that there was a 45° bend in the pipe approximately two feet down
grade

from

the

cleanout

on

his

property

(Transcript

at 99).

Appellant also testified concerning his observations and photographs
were presented to the jury indicating that there was a portion of
the pipe approximately eight feet down grade from the cleanout that
was collapsed (Transcript at 101). Appellant testified that this had
been caused by large rocks on the pipe, which he had removed from
the trench in order to expose the pipe,

-8-

and by improper bedding and

compaction

of the pipe

acknowledged

(Transcript

at

like those

removed by Appellant when he

that rocks

102).

The City's witness

exposed that section of the pipe, could cause the pipe to collapse
as testified by Appellant (Transcript at 129) and acknowledged that
a kink of that nature could cause the pipe to clog if paper and
debris which would normally pass down an unclogged pipe could not
get past

(Transcript at 127) . A careful homeowner might never be
'••• *:*&-

_

aware of the crease and only become aware of the crease if something
large enough were put in the pipe to block the opening

(Transcript

at 131) .
Although there was a cleanout on Appellant's property, there
was also a cleanout on Mr. Hopkins1 property (Transcript at 55-56).
The cleanout on Mr. Hopkins' property was uncapped approximately one
year prior to trial and, at the time of trial, was capped but had a
rock, brick or block on top of the cap (Transcript at 107).
At

trial

demonstrate

a

Appellant
lack

of

attempted

animosity

to

between

introduce
himself

evidence
and

"Ed",

to
the

alleged prospective purchaser during whose tenancy the sewer pipe
became clogged.

The court refused to allow Appellant to present

evidence on that issue (Transcript at 86).
During trial the court instructed the jury on the presumption
of innocence, did not explain the term reasonable doubt, but did
give the jury a "reasonable alternative hypothesis" instruction at
Counsel's request (Transcript at 142).
Following presentation of the City's case, Appellant moved foi:
a

directed

verdict

dismissing

the

matter

(See

transcript

of

sentencing at 2-3) .

That motion was denied.

jury's

just prior

verdict,

and

to

After return of the

sentencing, Appellant

motion for a judgement notwithstanding the verdict.

made

a

That motion was

also denied (Transcript of sentencing at 3 ) .
This appeal followed.
VI. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In this case Appellant claims, as error, failure of the Trial
Court to disqualify himself or to have been disqualified pursuant to
Appellant's Affidavit of Bias or Prejudice, that the evidence is
insufficient

to

support

the verdict

and

that

the

Trial

Court's

exclusion of evidence concerning Appellant's relationship with the
occupant of the home serviced by a sewer line Appellant is alleged
to have clogged was error entitling Appellant to a new trial.
Appellant, as a defendant in a criminal case, was entitled to
present a defense, including evidence concerning motive or lack of
motive to commit the crime.
opportunity

The Trial Court refused Appellant the

to do so by refusing him the opportunity

to present

evidence concerning his friendly relationship with the occupant of
the home serviced by the sewer line Appellant was alleged to have
clogged.

Especially in light of alleged threats made to the owner

of that property, Appellant's friendly relationship with the actual
occupant

and

alleged

prospective

purchaser

of

the

property

was

certainly relevant in order to demonstrate lack of motive on the
part of

Appellant to commit the crime charged.

The Trial Court's

refusing to allow Appellant the opportunity to present that evidence
denied Appellant an opportunity to present a meaningful defense in
violation of Article 1, Section 12 of the Utah State Constitution
and the Sixth Amendement to the United States Constitution.
-10-

Although there was some circumstantial evidence presented at
trial that supports the verdict of the jury, when viewed in light of
the burden of proof required in a criminal case, that evidence was
not sufficient, even if viewed

in a light most favorable to the

jury, to support the verdict.
In this instance the Trial Court and the court reviewing the
Affidavit of Bias or Prejudice abused their discretion in finding
that the Affidavit of Bias or Prejudice was insufficient on its
face, especially in light of the Trial Court's written response to
the Affidavit, expressing his perception of Appellant and of its own
leniency with regard to a previous case involving Appellant.
VII. ARGUMENT
A.
THE JURY'S VERDICT, FINDING THAT THE DEFENDANT HAD
DEPOSITED MATERIAL IN THE PUBLIC SEWER WHICH WOULD OR COULD CAUSE
DAMAGE TO THE PUBLIC SEWER WAS UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL.
In Harline vs. Campbell, 728 P.2d. 980

(Utah 1986) the Court

reaffirmed prior rulings that the factual findings of a Trial Court
will not be disturbed unless there is no substantial record in the
evidence to support them.

In that case, the Court indicated that,

in order to obtain review of a factual finding of the Trial Court,
the Appellant must marshall all evidence in support of the Trial
Court's findings and then demonstrate that even when viewed in the
light most favorable to the factual determination made by the Trial
Court, the evidence

is insufficient to support

its

similar rule governs an appeal of a jury verdict.
of Bartell,

P.2d.

, 105 U.A.R.

3

findings.

In In re; Estate
(Utah 1989) the

Supreme Court stated:
"When the appeal is from a jury's fact finding, we have
said that the appellant has the obligation to marshall all
-11 -

A

the evidence in support of those findings and, considering
the evidence in a light most favorable to the jury, still
demonstrate that the findings lack substantial evidentary
support. 105 U.A.R. at 4.
Even viewed in a light most favorable to the findings of the trier
of fact, there is insufficient evidence, in fact a total lack of
evidence, to support the conclusion that whatever was in the sewer
system, whether deposited by Appellant or not, was "material which
would or could cause damage to the public sewer."
The only evidence presented at trial on the issue of whether
the material would or could cause damage to the public sewer was
that a rock like object was located in a sewer line servicing Mr.
Hopkins' property, located on Appellant's property roughly in the
vicinity of a crease which stopped the rock like object from passing
through that individual line into the main.

There was no evidence

presented on a critical element of the offense, that is, whether
that object would or could cause damage to the public sewer.
that reason alone

the verdict of the jury

should be

For

set aside.

However, even if there were sufficient evidence to support a finding
by the jury that this rock like object would or could cause damage
to the public sewer, there was insufficient evidence at trial to
support

the

finding

of

the

jury

that

Appellant

deposited

that

material in the public sewer.
At the trial of this matter, testimony was presented, although
rebutted, that Appellant had made a threat that if his neighbor, Mr.
Hopkins, sold his adjacent lot and home that Appellant would block
the sewer.
what

There was also testimony that the sewer was blocked by

appeared

on

a

black

and

white

-12-

monitor

to

be

a

rock.

Unfortunately,

the

jury was

not able to view what was

through the monitor because a video tape was not made.

observed

In light of

the allegations of threat, the existence of a rock like obstruction
in the sewer line and Appellant's access to the sewer line through
the cleanout on his property, it is possible that Appellant could
have placed
Hopkins1

something

sewer line.

in the sewer system in order to block Mr.
However, although there is some evidence to

support the verdict, even when viewed in a light most favorable to
the verdict the evidence is insufficient i.e. not substantial enough
to support the verdict.
The evidence presented, must be viewed in its totality in order
to assess whether or not the evidence, even when viewed favorably to
the verdict, supports the verdict.

Disregarding Appellant's denial

of wrong doing, the other relevant evidence that must be considered
is:

At the time the blockage occurred, the cleanout on Mr. Miller's

property was not visible, apparently because

it was underground,

suggesting lack of access; there was access to the sewer line from
the exterior of Mr. Hopkins1 home; and Mr. Hopkins was not on the
premises at all times and so could not and did not testify whether
or not someone else could have placed something in the sewer through
the cleanout on his property which could slide down the sloped sewer
line until it stopped at the crease located approximately

six to

eight feet from the cleanout on Mr. Miller's property.
Even when viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, it
is just as possible that the rock, or whatever it was, was placed in
the pipe from Mr. Hopkins' property instead of from Mr, Millers. It
is therefore

just as likely as not that someone else placed the

object in the pipe, resulting in its being clogged.
•'

- 1 3 -

.

•

Pursuant to the burden of proof i.e. proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, and in light of the availability of a reasonable alternative
hypothesis, the evidence does not support the verdict and should be
dismissed.
B. APPELLANT WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW WHEN THE TRIAL
COURT REFUSED TO ALLOW HIM TO PRESENT, CONSISTENT WITH THE THEORY OF
HIS DEFENSE, EVIDENCE DEMONSTRATING THAT HE HAD NO ANIMOSITY TOWARD
THE INDIVIDUAL RESIDING IN THE PROPERTY SERVICED BY THE SEWER PIPE
ALLEGED TO HAVE BEE?! INTENTIONALLY CLOGGED FY APPELLANT.
As a general rule, the Supreme Court has indicated that it will
"not

interfere

with

a trial

court's

ruling

[excluding

evidence]

unless it clearly appears that the Court so abused its discretion
that

there

McCardell,

is
652

a

likelihood

P.2d.

942

that
at

injustice

944

(Utah

resulted.

1982).

State

However,

v.

that

statement must be viewed in light of Rules 401 and 402 of the Utah
Rules

of Evidence

and, by the

stronger reasoning, the

accused's

right to present a defense as guaranteed under Article I, Section 12
of the Utah State Constitution and the Sixth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.
to

allow

Appellant

In this instance, the Trial Court's refusing
to

present

evidence

concerning

his

lack

of

animosity against the individual residing in the home serviced by
the

sewer

line Appellant

is alleged

to have blocked

denied

the

Appellant an opportunity to present relevant evidence of a defense
and he is entitled to a new trial.
In Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) the United States
Supreme

Court

stated:

"the

right

to

offer

the

testimony

of

witnesses,...is in plain terms the right to present a defense, the
right to present the Defendant's version of the facts as well as
the prosecution's

to the

jury

so it may
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decide where

the truth

lies." 388 U.S. at 19.

The accused's "right to present a defense"

must be considered in determining whether or not offered evidence
should be admitted.
In this instance, the trial court refused to allow Appellant
the opportunity tc present evidence tending to show lack of motive
to

commit

the

crime

alleged.

That

was

Defendant's presentation of his defense.
that the sewer was blocked

a

key

element

in

the

Since there was evidence

and that Appellant, as well as other

individuals, had potential access to the sewer line so that they
could

have

blocked

it

and

there was

contradictory

testimony

by

Appellant and the alleged victim concerning whether or not Appellant
had made a threat to block the sewer and under what circumstances
that alleged threat would be carried out, Appellant's relationship
with the occupant of the mobile home serviced by the sewer line was
relevant to the issue of whether Appellant had a motive to commit
the crime.
In State vs. Smith, 728 P.2d. 1014 (Utah 1986) a defendant who
had been convicted

of theft by deception and theft by receiving

claimed that the trial court had erred in excluding his testimony
which was intended to show that he had a strong motivation to avoid
imprisonment and would not therefore have knowingly or intentionally
committed

the

crimes

charged.

In

analyzing

the

trial

court's

exclusion of that testimony, the Supreme Court stated:
"A defendant's lack of a motive to commit the crime
charged is...relevant evidence of innocence which he or
she is entitled tc place before the jury.... Although a
judge has discretion
in ruling on relevancy, that
discretion
should
be
exercised
with
considerable
liberality when the issue is motive because a wide
latitude of evidence is relevant and hence admissible to
prove motive." 728 P.2d. at 1016.
-15-

The court went on to state:

"That the persuasiveness of the

evidence may be weak or inconclusive goes to its weight, not its
admissibility."
in which

the

728 P.2d. at 1016.
Supreme

Court

of

The court then cited an example

Massachusetts

had

held

that

the

testimony of a defendant's father that he told her he would give her
money in reasonable amounts if she needed it, although perhaps not
of great value in the defendant's murder/robbery trial, should have
been permitted as tending to shov/ that the defendant had no motive
for robbery, citing

Commonwealth v. Ellison, 379 NE, 2d. 560 (Mass

1978) .
It is clear that the trial court should have allowed Appellant
the

opportunity

to present

the

testimony

offered.

However, the

inquiry does not end with a determination that the evidence should
have been offered.

If the court's refusal to permit the evidence is

harmless error then Appellant would not be entitled to a reversal.
That was

the ultimate holding

in the

Smith

case,

in which

the

Supreme Court indicated that it will "reverse only if it appears
that there is a reasonable likelihood that the absence of the error
may have provided a different result,"
In this case the admission

728 P.2d. at 1016.

of the evidence excluded by the

trial court would have created a reasonable likelihood that the jury
would have reached a different result.

The evidence presented by

the prosecution centered around Appellant's alleged animosity toward
the owner of the property

serviced by the sewer line and alleged

threats by Appellant that if the property were sold, Appellant would
block the sewer line.

Even if those statements were made, a jury

could reasonably conclude that if Appellant had friendly feelings
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toward the prospective purchaser he would not have been inclined to
clog

the

relevant

sewer.

Appellant's

relationship

with

Ed was

certainly

in order to demonstrate whether or not Appellant had a

motive to block the sewer line.

The Trial Court's refusing to allow

Appellant an opportunity to present that testimony denied him the
right to present a meaningful defense and entitles Appellant to a
reversal of his conviction and a new trial.
C. APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO HAVE HIS CONVICTION REVERSED WHERE
THE JUDGE PRESIDING AT THE JURY TRIAL CONTINUED TO ACT IN THE
CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE DESPITE THE TIMELY FILING OF AN
AFFIDAVIT OF BIAS OR PREJUDICE ALLEGING THAT THE PRESIDING JUDGE HAD
A BIAS AGAINST APPELLANT AS EVIDENCED BY HIS RULING AGAINST
APPELLANT IN AT LEAST ONE OTHER CRIMINAL MATTER IN THE PAST, WHERE
THE JUDGE, IN RESPONSE TO THOSE CLAIMS, WROTE THAT HE PERCEIVED HIS
SENTENCE IN THAT CASE AS "LENIENT" IN LIGHT OF SPECIFICALLY
ENUMERATED AGGRAVATING FACTORS,
Appellant filed an Affidavit of Bias or Prejudice, seeking an
alternate presiding judicial officer in this case, on or about July
12, 1989.

(Record at 6-8). Shortly thereafter the judge against

whom the Affidavit was filed, Robert F. Owens, denied the Affidavit
of Bias or Prejudice

and certified

the matter to Judge Dean E.

Conder for ruling on the sufficiency of the Affidavit
9-10).

(Record at

In the Order referring the matter to Judge Conder, Judge

Owens pointed out that he and the prosecuting attorney were first
cousins but that the Utah Code of Judicial Conduct would not mandate
disqualification

unless

they

were

within

the

third

degree

of

relationship, argued that recusal by himself in all cases involving
this prosecutor would have a severe impact on the operation of the
Court and denied a claim in the Affidavit that he and the prosecutor
had professional contact during their practice of law in the Phoenix
area.

In addition, Judge Owens pointed out that he felt he had been
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fair

with

the

Appellant

in

a previous

case

and

had

imposed

a

relatively lenient fine, "in the context of a threat to use guns on
neighbors
promises

in
to

a
be

long-standing
simmering

for

neighborhood
years

to

dispute,

come, mutual

one

which

restraining

orders notwithstanding" (Record at 9 ) . On or about the 19th day of
July, 1989, Judge Conder issued an order finding that the Affidavit
did not show sufficient grounds for disqualification and the motion
for disqualification was ordered denied (Record at 10). The matter
proceeded to a jury trial.
The issue concerning this aspect of the case is whether Judge
Owens should have been disqualified in light of the allegations in
the Affidavit and his response.
Appellant readily acknowledges
Court's

rulings

during

trial

and

that the record of the Trial
the

sentence

imposed

do

not

demonstrate bias as the basis for those rulings to the exclusion of
other possibilities.
the

Trial

Appellant

Court's
submits

For that reason a separate analysis of each of
rulings
that

the

will

not

conviction

be

undertaken.

should

be

However,

reversed

and

remanded for a new trial with a non-disqualified Judge regardless of
whether the Trial Court's rulings in this case specifically indicate
bias or prejudice sufficient to alter the outcome of the trial to
the exclusion of other reasons for those rulings where the Judge
should have been disqualified in the first instance.
The leading case that has been cited with reference to the
issue of disqualification
P.2d.

520

(Utah

1948).

of a judge is Haslam v. Morrison, 190
In

Haslam

the

petitioner

had

filed

an

application for writ of mandate directing respondent Judge Morrison
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to

grant

petitioner's

motion

that

another

disqualified, be called in to try the case.

district

judge,

not

Petitioner had filed an

action for false imprisonment in Judge's Morrison's court and had
filed an affidavit in that case stating that he believed that he
could not obtain a fair and impartial trial before Judge Morrison
because

the

judge

was

biased

and

prejudiced

against

him.

The

grounds for the conclusion were that the judge in a prior trial had
made arbitratory rulings against petitioner, had rudely interrupted
and stepped petitioner while he was testifying, which tended to get
petitioner confused and upset, and at the conclusion of that prior
trial Judge Morrison had deliberately announced and stated in open
court

that

he

didn't

believe

petitioner

against petitioner in the case.

and

rendered

judgment

The affidavit further alleged that

petitioner's wife, who was also a witness in that case, felt that
Judge Morrison's rulings and interruptions showed that he was biased
and prejudiced against petitioner and accused them of giving false
and

perjured

testimony

and

that

she, although

an

indispensable

witness, refused to come and testify at trial if Judge Morrison were
the presiding

judge.

The petitioner in that matter alleged that

Judge Morrison had ignored the affidavit of bias or prejudice and
that therefore the motion was filed that another district judge, not
disqualified, be called

in to to try the case.

That motion was

denied and the application for writ of mandate was filed.
In Haslam the majority of the court defined bias and prejudice
as

"hostile

feeling

or

spirit

of

ill

will

toward

one

of

the

litigants or undue friendship or favoritism toward one" (190 P. 2d.
at 523). The court pointed out that although "the mere filing of an
affidavit of bias or prejudice does not ipso
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facto disqualify a

judge", (190 P.2d. 523) the general practice in that jurisdiction of
judges disqualifying

themselves whenever

an affidavit of bias or

prejudice against them had been filed was a commendable practice
because:
"The purity and integrity of the judicial process
ought to be protected against any taint of suspicion to
the end that the public and litigants may have the highest
confidence in the integrity and fairness of the courts."
(190 P.2d. at 523-524)
and that
"It is ordinarily better for a judge to disqualify himself
even though he may be entirely free of bias and prejudice
if either litigant files an affidavit of bias and
prejudice. 'Next in importance to the duty of rendering a
righteous judgment is that of doing it in such a manner as
will beget no suspicion of the fairness or integrity of
the judge' (190 P.2d. at 523-524).
Although
Supreme

the

Court

practice

did

of

acknowledge

that

district

that,

was

although

approved,

actual

bias

the
and

prejudice on the part of the trial judge for or against any litigant
will

disqualify

him,

"the existence

of bias

and

prejudice

is a

question addressed to the sound discretion of the judge against whom
the affidavit is filed."
Rule
§77-35-29

63(b)
clearly

of

the

190 P.2d. at 523.
Utah

supersede

at

Rules

of

Civil

least part

of

Procedure
the

and

ruling

UCA

in the

Kaslam case by directing that another judge pass on the sufficiency
of the affidavit alleging bias or prejudice.

However, -the Haslam

decision has been cited with approval on several occasions not so
much for its ultimate holding but for its analysis and specifically
for

Justice

Wade's

concurring

opinion.

Justice

Wade

suggested

several reasons for a judge, against whom an affidavit of bias or
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prejudice is filed, to disqualify himself.

Those include: (1) if an

affidavit of bias or prejudice is filed there is no good reason for
the court not to disqualify himself.

Justice Wade stated:

"If the judge is not biased and prejudiced, there does not
seem to be any good reason why, if a litigant in this
court believes he is, that he should not get another judge
to try the case since the result of the litigation should
be the same in both cases. In this state, a change of
judge in a particular case can be readily arranged without
inconvenience either to the court or the litigants." 190
P.2d. at 526;
(2) By stepping aside a judge against whom an affidavit of prejudice
is filed lessens the likelihood that his remaining on the case will
be

perceived

as

an effort

to

"vent his

against whom he is prejudiced".

spleen

on the

190 P. 2d. at 526.

litigant

Justice Wade

stated:
"Even though the judge is entirely free from bias and
prejudice where he refuses to make the change the party
making the application therefore will very likely always
believe that in making such ruling he had ulterior
motives." 190 P.2d. at 526;
and, (3) Even if there is no actual bias, if there is a suggestion
of bias or prejudice, by

stepping

aside, the

impartiality of the court system is preserved.

appearance

of the

Justice Wade stated:

"One of the most important things in government is that
all persons subject to its jurisdiction shall always be
able to obtain a fair and impartial trial in all matters
of litigation in its courts. It is nearly as important
that the people have absolute confidence in the integrity
of the courts.
I can think of nothing that would as
surely bring the courts into disrepute as for a judge to
insist on trying a case where one of the litigants
believes that such judge is biased and prejudiced against
him.
This is especially true where the judge in a
previous case has made remarks which indicated that he
questioned the veracity or integrity of such litigant. I
therefore believe that in such a case it would be very
desirable for the judge to disqualify himself whether he
was in fact biased and prejudiced against such party or
not." 190 P.2d. at 526.
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In Marchant v. Marchant, 743 P.2d. 199 (Utah App. 1987) Justice
Davidson

quoted

from

the majority

opinion

in Haslam

and Justice

Wade's concurrence when he wrote:
"We offer the general philosophy expressed in Haslam v.
Morrison, 113 Utah 14, 190 P.2d. 520, 523 (1948), noting
that an affidavit of bias and prejudice is treated
differently today than it was in 1948... 743 P.2d. at
207-208.
Although Haslam has been cited in cases regarding efforts to
have

a Judge

disqualified,

the case appears

to have been cited

primarily for its statement of general philosophy.

State v. Neeley,

748 P.2d. 1091 (Utah 1988), however, is one of the few cases since
Haslam in which the court provided some guidance instead of general
philosophy regarding disqualification.
In Neeley, the Court reaffirmed

its earlier

stand that "the

integrity of the judicial system should be protected against any
taint of suspicion" and recommended

that "a judge recuse himself

where there is a colorable claim of bias or prejudice."
at

1094.

The Court

also

indicated

that

"a

judge

748 P.2d.

should

recuse

himself when his 'impartiality' might reasonably be questioned" and
that that practice "may require recusal in instances where no actual
bias is shown."

748 P.2d.

at 10 84.

The Court suggested that a

"trial judge disqualify himself whenever an affidavit of bias and
prejudice

is

filed

against

him

in good

faith"

acknowledge that "this practice is not mandatory".
Byington,

200

P.2d.

723

(Utah

1948).

748

P.2d.

but

went

on

to

Citing State v.
at

1094.

The

ultimate conclusion of the Supreme Court in the Neeley case on this
issue, appears to be that, although the better practice would be for
the judge to disqualify himself, "absent a showing of actual bias or
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an abuse of discretion, failure [of the judge to disqualify himself]
did not constitute reversible error as long as the requirements of
§77-35-29 are met."

748 P.2d. at 1094-1095.

In light of the Neeley ruling, then, the issue in this case is
whether the requirements of §77-35-29 were met or was there an abuse
of

discretion.

technically

Appellant

the

respectfully

procedural

steps

maintains

suggested

in

that,

although

§77-35-29

were

followed, based on the abuse of discretion standard this case should
be reversed.
UCA §77-35-29(d) provides:
(d) If the challenged judge questions the sufficiency of
the allegation of disqualification, he shall enter an
order directing that a copy be forthwith certified to
another named judge of the same court or of a court of
like jurisdiction, which judge shall then pass upon the
legal sufficiency of the allegations. If the challenged
judge does not question the legal sufficiency of the
affidavit, or if the judge to whom the affidavit is
certified finds that it is legally sufficient, another
judge shall be called to try the case or to conduct the
proceeding.
If the judge to whom the affidavit is
certified does not find the affidavit to be legally
sufficient, he shall enter a finding to that effect and
the challenged judge shall proceed with the case or
proceeding.
There is no claim by Appellant that the Trial Judge did not
technically comply with the procedural requirements of §77-35-29.
However, Appellant maintains that the Affidavit of Bias or Prejudice
is sufficient on its face and that, even if not, the Trial Judge's
written response demonstrates sufficient bias or prejudice that, in
light

of

the

policy

previously

cited,

a

non-disqualified

judge

should have presided at the trial.
Current
respect

to

rules
a

governing

specific

case

disqualification
are
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found

in

of

Utah

a
Code

judge

with

Annotated

§77-35-29, previously mentioned, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct, Rule 63(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Utah
Code Annotated §78-7-1.
conditions

that

These Rules and Statutes establish certain

mandate

disqualification.

However,

even

though

there are now specific instances where disqualification must occur
and there is now a process whereby another judge is called in to
pass on the motion to disqualify, the Haslam court's reliance on the
"sound discretion" of the trial judge suggests that discretion, or
abuse of that discretion in ruling on the affidavit, is still a
necessary consideration even if the specific factors that mandate
disqualification are not alleged.
Appellant maintains that the matter of disqualification was one
submitted

to

the discretion

of

the court, that

the Trial Court

abused its discretion by refusing to disqualify himself and that the
reviewing Judge abused his discretion by upholding that decision in
light

of

the

Trial

Judgefs

written

remarks

in

response

to

prosecutor,

to

the

Affidavit.
The

Trial

Court's

relationship

the

falling

within the forth degree of relationship, would not normally mandate
disqualification.

On

the

face

of

the

Affidavit

and

the

Trial

Court's Response there does not appear to be anything about that
relationship

to

suggest

that

it

is

a

close

enough

personal

relationship so as to create an actual bias or prejudice in favor of
the prosecutor.

However, that allegation, when coupled with the

Appellant's concern regarding the Judge's previous rulings in the
case and, by the stronger reasoning, the Court's response to that
claim, does create an appearance of impartiality.
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In his response to the allegations in the Affidavit, the Court
stated that he had imposed a "relatively lenient fine of $100.00, in
the context of a threat to use guns on neighbors in a long-standing
neighborhood dispute, one which promises to be simmering for years
to come, mutual restraining order notwithstanding"
This

suggests

that

the

Judge

does

reference to Appellant, Appellant!s

harbor

(Record at 9) .

some

concern

interation with his neighbors

and the Judge's own previously imposed lenient sentence.
was

concerned

previous

enough

proceeding

about

his

to bring

own

perceived

that to

obviously considered aggravating.

with

light and

The Judge

leniency
cite

in

the

factors he

His concern, expressed pre-trial,

creates the appearance of impartiality.

A totally neutral presiding

judicial officer would not have had those same views or expressed
those same concerns.
Whether

or

not

the

Trial

Judge

was

actually

biased

or

prejudiced at trial can not be clearly demonstrated from the record.
The Court's rulings with reference to evidentary matters and jury
instructions could be based on considerations other than prejudice
against Appellant.
Trial Court's

However, Appellant respectfully submits that the

refusal

to disqualify

appearance of impartiality

himself

constituted

in the

face of the

an abuse of discretion by

both the Judge for whom disqualification was sought and the Judge
who reviewed the Affidavit and that the case should be remanded with
instructions,

that,

consistent

Prejudice, the case be

with

assigned

the

Affidavit

for trial to a

Judge.
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of

Bias

or

non-disqualified

CONCLUSION
In

this

conviction
evidence

case

and

an

presented

Appellant

is

order

acquittal

of

was not

entitled

to

for

sufficient

a

reversal

the

reason

to establish

an

of

his

that

the

essential

element of the offense: that the material, even if deposited by
Appellant, would or could cause damage to the public sewer, nor was
the evidence sufficient to prove that, whatever the material would
or could do, Appellant had deposited it.

However, in the event the

Court

evidence

finds

that

there

was

sufficient

to

support

the

verdict, Appellant is entitled to a new trial, having been denied an
opportunity to present a meaningful defense.
demonstrate

to the

jury his

friendly

He was not allowed to

relationship

to the

actual

occupant of the property serviced by the plugged sewer line and,
therefore, his lack of motive to commit the act alleged.

Finally,

this case should be remanded for a new trial before a Judge not
disqualified, by reason of the Trial Courtfs and reviewing Judge's
abuse

of

discretion

in

failing

to

disqualify

the

Trial

Judge

pursuant to the Affidavit of Bias or Prejudice, especially in light
of the Trial Judge's written comments concerning Appellant and the
Judge's perception of its own previous leniency.
WHEREFORE,

Appellant

respectfully

requests

that

the

Court

reverse the guilty verdict and enter an order of cicquittal or, in
the alternative, that the Court remand this case for a new trial
before a judge who is not disqualified and that the Court direct
that

Appellant

be

allowed

an

opportunity
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to

present

testimony

concerning

his

relationship

with

the

occupant

of

the

property

serviced by the sewer line Appellant is alleged to have clogged.
DATED this

day of February, 1990.
GALLIAN & WESTFALL

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed four true and correct copies of
the Appellate Brief, postage pre-paid on this
2>*/tl- day of
February, 1990, to the following:
Theodore W. Shumway
St. George City Attorney
175 East 200 North
St. George, Utah 84770
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ADDENDUM

Article I, Section 12 of the Utah State Constitution*
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to
appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and
cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to
testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses
against him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of
witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an
impartial jury of the county of district in which the offense is
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all
cases* ...
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and
district wherein the crimes shall have been committed which district
shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor and to have the assistance of counsel for his
defence.
Utah Rules of Evidence.
Rule 401. Definition of "relevant evidence".
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it
would be without the evidence.
Rule 402. Relevant evidence generally admissible; irrelevant
evidence inadmissible.
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise
provided by the Constitution of the United States, or by these
rules, or by other rules applicable in courts of this state.
Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.

FILED
JUL 1 ^ 1989
CIRCUIT COURT
St George Dept
GALLIAN & WESTFALL
G. Michael Westfall #3434
Attorney for Defendant
ONE SOUTH MAIN STREET
DIXIE STATE BANK BUILDING
P. 0. Box 367
ST. GEORGE, UTAH 84770
(801) 628-1682
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
WASHINGTON COUNTY, ST. GEORGE DEPARTMENT
CITY OF ST. GEORGE,

)

Plaintiff,
VS.

)

AFFIDAVIT OF BIAS
OR PREJUDICE AND
CERTIFICATE OF GOOD FAITH

)

ELZA E. MILLER,

)
Defendant.

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON

)
)
)

Case No. 891000968

)

ss

Pursuant to Rule 63(b), of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
Elza E. Miller, Defendant above-named, upon first being duly sworn,
deposes and states as follows:
1.

I am the Defendant in the above-entitled matter.

2.

On or about June 22, 1989, a summons was issued in the

above-entitled Court, requiring that I appear in Court to answer the
charge that I had violated §1102(a) of the Uniform Plumbing Code as
adopted.
3.

I am informed and believe that the Honorable Robert F.

Owens is a first cousin to Theodore W. Shumway, the St. George City
M2/8

6

prosecuting attorney.

In addition I am informed and believe that

Judge Owens and Mr. Shumway each practiced law in Phoenix, Arizona
and that they were acquainted before they both moved to St. George,
Utah.

In addition, Judge Owens has ruled against myself and my wife

in criminal cases in the past despite our testimony that we had not
violated the law.
Judge
officer

in

Owens
this

should
case

therefore
because

not be the presiding

1)

he

is

acquainted with the prosecuting attorney

personally

judicial

related "TO
' and

in an other than purely

professional capacity, 2) Judge Owens, having already made decisions
against me in the past which can only mean that he did not believe
me in those instances, could not be expected to render a decision in
my favor in this instance if my credibility is called into question
and, 3) Judge Owens is aware of prior convictions of myself and my
wife

for

criminal

convictions

which

would

otherwise

not

be

admissible in Court for the purpose of impeachment.
DATED this

/^L

day of July, 1989.

Elz-a E. Miller
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON

)
) ss.
)

On the
)d
day of July 1989, personally appeared before me
Elza E. Miller, the signer of the foregoing document, who upon being
duly sworn, acknowledged to me that he executed the;same.

/ % /

My Commission Expires'£i=»-»

\ ~ , \

—-Residing In:

7

CERTIFICATE OF GOOD FAITH
I hereby certify that this Affidavit is asserted by my client
in good faith and not for any improper purpose.
DATED this

f/-

day of July, 19 89.
GALLIAN & WESTFALL

By:
G"." Michi'el
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I hano^QQirWer^d a true and correct copy
of the above and foregoing document on the "S^br day of July, 1989, to
the following:
\£*^
Theodore W. Shumway
St. George City Attorney
175 E. 200 N.
St. George, Utah 84770

Secretary

_j-
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CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
WASHINGTON COUNTY, ST. GEORGE DEPARTMENT

CITY OF ST. GEORGE,
Plaintiff
vs.

ORDER

ECZ& E. MILLER,
Defendant

Case No. 8910001368

The Defendant filed an Affidavit of Bias and Prejudice on
July 12, 1989. This is the second such filing by this Defendant
on essentially the same allegations, the first having been denied.
IT IS ORDERED certifying this case to Judge Dean E. Conder for
a ruling on the sufficiency, along with the following comments.
1. The Utah Code of Judicial Conduct sets the standard for
disqualification at the 3rd degree of relationship (Canon 3,C,1,D).
Ted Shurmvay, as a first cousin, is at the 4th degree.
2.

Since Ted Shumway is St. George City Attorney, recusal by

myself in all city cases would have a severe inpact on the operation
of the court, because they constitute half the workload.
3. Although we each practiced law in the Phoenix area for
several years (Ted in Scottsdale and I in North Phoenix), I recall
no professional contact. Phoenix had about 30 superior courts and
a thousand lawyers in that period.
4.

Ruling against someone in a previous hearing is not, in

itself, evidence of bias.

I have reviewed the transcript of the

previous case, City of St. George v. Eliza E. Miller, No. 891000348
(now on appeal), and it indicates at least as many interim rulings
for the defendant as against him, as well as a relatively lenient
• fine of $100, in the context of a threat to use guns on neighbors in
a long-standing neighborhood dispute, one which promises to be
simnering for years to come, mutual restraining orders notwithstanding.
Ci

July 18, 1989

Robert F. Ovens
Circuit Judge
I certify that a true copy of the foregoing ORDER was sentv"-v>>—
postage prepaid, on this 18th day of July, 1989, to the following
interested parties:
G. Michael Westfall
One South Main Street
Dixie State Bank Building
P.O. Box 367
St. George, Utah 84770
Theodore W. Shumway
St. George City Attorney
175 E. 200 N.
St. George, Utah 84770

Tanna Hammer
Deputy Court Clerk
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IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT

^--^TSorgoBe^r

COUNTY OF WASHINGTON, STATE OF UTAH
CITY OF ST. GEORGE,
Plaintiff,

JUDGMENT

vs.
ELZA E. MILLER
1926 West 1700 North
St. George, Utah 84770

Case No. 891000968

Defendant.

The above matter having come on for trial before a jury on
Defendant Elza E. Miller's plea of not guilty to charges of
violating Sec. 1102(a), Uniform plumbing Code as adopted by St.
George, the Defendant being present and represented by counsel,
and the jury having heard the evidence presented by the parties
and rendered a verdict that the Defendant was guilty as charged,
Based upon the verdict of the jury and good cause appearing
therefor, Defendant Elza E. Miller is found and adjudged to be
guilty of the charge against him.

The Defendant appeared

for

sentencing on October 3, 1989, and a fine of $750*00 is imposed,
$500.00 of which
conditions
citizen;

is suspended

for a period

of one

year

on

(1) that Defendant conduct himself as a law-abiding
(2) that he either remove or cause to be removed any

stones or foreign objects in the undergound line connecting

54

improvements on the property of John Hopkins and the City sewer
main where it traverses the Defendant's property, repairing any
openings

made

therein

unobstructed, repaired
building

in order
line

to do

inspected

so, and

having

by a St. George

inspector- before again covering with soil;

the
City

(3) that

Defendant remove the clean-out valve on the John Hopkins line
which is located on the Defendant' s property as a part of the
repairs to be effected and inspected by the City of St. George;
and (4) that Defendant use every reasonable discretion to avoid
confrontations or loud and overt actions calculated

to draw

attention to the Defendant during those periods when John Hopkins
is showing his property to a prospective buyer.
DONE IN OPEN COURT this 3rt day of t)cLoirer, 1989.

Robert F. Owens
r
Circuit Court Judge,..

